

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 170679

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR,UNGA,KS,KN

SUBJECT:KOREAN AMBASSADOR CALLS ON DEPARTMENT

1. KOREAN AMBASSADOR HAHM PYONG-CHUN CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEWIS JULY 7 TO DISCUSS STATUS OF CORE GROUP CONSULTATIONS AND DIRECTION IN WHICH THOSE TALKS WERE HEADING. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN RATIONALE FOR NOT SEEKING PRIORITY EVEN THOUGH CORE GROUP HAD CONCLUDED THAT ANOTHER UNGA DEBATE ON KOREA WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE.

2. HAHM ASKED INITIALLY ABOUT GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S VISIT TO AFRICA, AND WONDERED WHETHER ANY NEW POINTS HAD EMERGED FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS ON THE KOREAN ISSUE. LEWIS REPLIED THAT SCRANTON RECEIVED MIXED REACTIONS TO HIS APPEAL THAT GOVERNMENTS EXERCISE MODERATION AND RESTRAINT AT COLOMBO AND OPPOSE NORTH KOREA'S HARD-LINE POSITION. LEWIS ALSO NOTED THAT SOME
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COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THEY HAD NOT

HEARD FROM ROK EMISSARIES IN DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN POSITION. HAHM OBSERVED THAT THE CORE GROUP COUNTRIES HAD AGREED TO LOBBY ON BEHALF OF THE ROK AND THEMSELVES,

BUT ADDED THAT ROKG WOULD BE SENDING SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SHORTLY TO OVER 40 COUNTRIES IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION. LEWIS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS MOVE AND SAID THAT WE WOULD URGE CORE GROUP GOVERNMENTS AT THE NEXT MEETING IN NEW YORK TO INSTRUCT THEIR MISSIONS TO ASSIST THE ROK DELEGATIONS.

3. RESPONDING TO A QUERY ON STRATEGY, HAHM ARGUED THAT IF THE NORTH KOREAN CHALLENGE IS TO BE MET, WE MUST HAVE AN APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO COUNTER ANYTHING THEY PUT FORWARD AND, HE CONTINUED, THIS LEADS NATURALLY TO SEEKING PRIORITY. HOWEVER, HE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS TREND OF THINKING MOVES US IN THE DIRECTION OF CONFRONTATION WHICH IS OPPOSED TO THE LINE THE CORE GROUP HAS ADOPTED. HE ASKED WHAT THE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, NOTING THAT BOTH BELGIUM AND THE FRG HAD EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR SEEKING PRIORITY RATHER THAN WAITING UNTIL NORTH KOREA HAD SUBMITTED A RESOLUTION. LEWIS RESPONDED THAT IN OUR VIEW SEEKING PRIORITY IS NOT AN OVERRIDING ISSUE. WE SHOULD ARGUE IN OUR BILATERAL CONTACTS THAT CONFRONTATION WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE; SHOULD THE OTHER SIDE STILL OPT FOR CONFRONTATION, THEN WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONFRONT THEM IN DEBATE. LEWIS CONTINUED THAT WITH KIM IL-SONG PRESENT AT COLOMBO, AN OUTCOME THERE WHICH WILL LEAD TO AN UNGA CONFRONTATION MAY WELL BE UNAVOIDABLE. HOWEVER, WE HOPE THAT MODERATES AMONG NON-ALIGNED--IN RESPONSE TO CORE GROUP AND DIRECT ROKG APPEALS--WOULD AT LEAST SPEAK UP AT COLOMBO SO THAT IT WILL BE CLEAR THAT A PRO-NORTH KOREAN DECLARATION ON KOREA WAS NOT UNANIMOUS. SEVERAL COUNTRIES SPOKE UP AT ALGIERS ON THIS ISSUE AND THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO AGAIN MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN, ESPECIALLY AT THE NACC FONMIN'S PRE-SUMMIT MEETING IN COLOMBO.

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4. HAHM ASKED WHETHER THE PRE-COLOMBO POLITICAL INITIATIVE WE ENVISAGED WOULD PLACE NORTH KOREA ON THE DEFENSIVE. LEWIS SAID THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSALS OF LAST YEAR WERE STILL VIABLE AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RESTATE THEM PUBLICLY WELL BEFORE COLOMBO. THIS WOULD BE DONE WITHOUT ANY MAJOR NEW ELEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE RECOMMENDED BY CORE GROUP

MEMBERS. THE MORE DETAILS CONTAINED IN SUCH A PROPOSAL, THE MORE APT THAT CONTROVERSY WOULD BE PROVOKED; MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE ITSELF WOULD BE THE PLACE FOR ADDITIONAL IDEAS TO BE DISCUSSED.

5. HAHM ASKED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PRO-ROK RESOLUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION. LEWIS SAID IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE DRAFT RESOLUTION NOW AS IT IDENTIFIED INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS THAT CAN BE USED IN LOBBYING EFFORTS. HE CAUTIONED THAT A REACTIVE RESOLUTION, WHICH WILL NOT HAVE PRIORITY, MUST HAVE AT LEAST ONE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT DISTINCT FROM THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMPETING RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO AVOID A UNGA MOTION RULING A VOTE ON IT AS UNNECESSARY AFTER THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION IS ADOPTED. ASKED WHETHER A PRO-NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION WOULD BE VAGUE AS TO WHO SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN PEACE AGREEMENT TALKS, HAHM EXPLAINED THAT NORTH KOREA MIGHT DELIBERATELY TRY TO FUZZ THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THEY WERE STUCK WITH THEIR DOCTRINAL POSITION THAT A QUOTE PEACE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE COULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE ROK BECAUSE THEY ARGUED THAT THE ROK WAS NOT A STATE.

6. HAHM THOUGHT IT WOULD HELP TO CONSIDER HAVING THE NEUTRALS, LIKE THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, PRESENT THEIR OWN RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OUR SIDE. LEWIS OBSERVED THAT SOME TACTICAL ADVANTAGES ACCRUED FROM THIS COURSE, BUT WE COULD LOSE CONTROL OF RESOLUTION UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE ROKUN AND USUN CONSULT ON THIS QUESTION AND DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE ASEANS AS WELL AS THE NORDICS MIGHT BE USEFUL TO BRING BEFORE THE CORE GROUP. HAHM CLARIFIED AGAIN HIS
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UNDERSTANDING THAT CORE GROUP HAD GENERALLY AGREED TO SACRIFICE PRIORITY FOR THE SAKE OF CONSISTENCY, REMARKING THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT BOTH IN SEOUL AND WITH ROKUN. LEWIS ASSURED HIM THAT THIS WAS OUR THINKING ON SUBJECT, BUT ADMITTED THAT WE HAD NOT ASSERTED THIS VIEW STRONGLY PREFERRING THAT IT EMERGE FROM CORE GROUP CONSULTATIONS.

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